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WEST VIRGINIA LAW

QUARTERLY

STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES
INTOXICATING LIQUORS--CONFISCATION AND SALE OF AUTOMOBILE ENGAGED IN THE UNLAWFUL TRANSPORTATION OF
INTOXICANTS IN ITS EmCT ON THE INNOCENT OWNER OF THE
VEHICLE-NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING.-The enactment of

State and Federal ,prohibition enforcement Acts, passed
in pursuance to amendments to the State and United States
Constitutions,' the Federal amendment giving the State and
National governments concurrent powers, and the confiscation and sale of rum-running automobiles, as provided in
said statutes, gives rise to very practical questions relating

to the nature of the condemnation proceeding by which
the vehicle unlawfully transporting intoxicating liquors is

forfeited.

In this regard, the pertinent provisions of the

West Virginia statute are found in sections 14 and 17 of
Chapter 32A, of the Code. Section 14 provides (inter alia)
that:
"All automobiles, cars, boats (other than railway cars,
and steamboats), wagons, aircraft, beasts of burden, or
vehicles of any kind that are used to bring or carry excessive quantities of intoxicating liquors into the State,
or from one place to another within the State, or that
are known or found to contain excessive quantities of intoxicating liquors * * * * * * shall be subject to seizure,
forfeiture, and confiscation by the state. * * * * * The
state tax commissioner and the prosecuting attorney, or
either of them may institute a suit in equity in the circuit
court * * * * * , making all proper persons parties thereto. If the circuit court upon the hearing shall find that [in
substance, the seized vehicle was thus unlawfully transporting intoxicants into or within the State,] said court
shall adjudge such property to be a common and public
nuisance, and shall enter an order directing that the'same
be sold by the sheriff of the county, at public auction, to
the highest bidder, for cash; provided, however, that if
the court shall find that the bona fide owner of any vehicle of conveyance or other property seized and proceeded against under the provisions of this section did
not know of, consent to or acquiesce in such unlawful
use of said property, and that said owner had no cause
to believe that said property was being, or intended to
be, so unlawfully used, as aforesaid, then said court shall
enter an order releasing said property to the true oivner
thereof."
%CONSTITUTION OF -WEST VIRGINIA, Art. VI, §46 (ratified 1912); CONSTTUTION OP
THE UNITED STATES.

XVIII Amendment (1920).
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Section 14 further provides that a "bona fide lienor of
any such property shall be entitled to file his'petition and
become a party to any proceeding in equity under this section, and shall be permitted to share in the proceeds of the
sale of any such property, as his interest may appear," but
that neither husband nor wife to offender shall be deemed
bona fide owners within the meaning of this Act; that "either the state or the defendant shall have the right of appeal
from the judgment of the circuit court," if the value of the
confiscated property is not less than one hundred dollars;
and that notice of such sale shall be made by publication
in a newspaper in the county for four weeks and posted at
the door of the court house. Section 17 prescribes that the
suit shall be brought in the name of the state.
The Supreme Court of Appeals has recently been twice
called upon to consider cases arising from confiscation proceedings brought under these two sections. In the earlier
case, 2 the owner intervened; and the Supreme Court held
that, although the intervenor put the seized automobile into
the possession of the accused under such an agreement as in
West Virginia amounts to a conditional sales contract, he
was entitled to the release of the car, and that the stipulation in a memorandum, accompanying the "bailment" (as
the Court intimates that it would be treated in Pennsylvania,
which was the locus contractus) for immediate maturity of
deferred installments and giving the lessor the right to repossess the property, was not in itself evidence of knowledge or ground of belief on the lessor's part odf the lessee's
intent to devote the property to an unlawful use. Neither
this case nor the later decision,8 which, while arising from
a confiscation, was considered in the appellate Court solely
with reference to a procedural point, throws much light
upon the question as to whether the proceeding under the
West Virginia prohibition statute to confiscate and sell rumrunning vehicles binds only the parties to the suit, or is
conclusive upon the whole world. If the suit is a proceeding strictly in rem, it forever concludes the rights of everyone
in the subject-matter of the action ;4 but if it is only quasi in
2 State v. Chester Hall and the White Co., 91 W. Va. 648, 114 S. E. 250 (1922).
'State v. Crockett, 94 W. Va. 423, 119 S. E. 165 (1923).

The Belgenland, 114 U. S. 855 (1885).
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rem, it affects and determines only the rights and interests of
the parties before the court, in relation to the property involved. 5
The question, indeed, is a very practical one, as the confiscation and sale of "bootleg" automobiles is of 4ot infrequent occurrence. Let us suppose, for instance, that A is
caught in the act of transporting "excessive quantities of
intoxicating liquors" (to use the language of the statute)
into, or through West Virginia, in an automobile. The
state brings a proceeding in equity for the condemnation
and sale of the car. At the hearing it does not appear
that A is not the owner of the confiscated vehicle. Notice of the sale is published in a newspaper of the county
for four weeks, and is posted at the front door of the
court house. B, in good faith, buys in the car for value,
at the sheriff's sale. It later develops that the true owner
of the automobile was C, who during all this time had
been living in a distant county of the state, or in another state, and that he knew nothing, as a matter of fact,
of the seizure, condemnation, and sale of his car; it also
appears that C leased the machine to A, but without knowledge that A would put it to an unlawful use. Let us assume,
further, that there was a stipulation in the lease, such as
there was in State v. Chester Hall and the White Company,0
by virtue of which C was entitled to repossess the automobile, if it should be put to an unlawful use. Should B in a
case such as.is here suggested, be compelled to give up the
car, or be held liable to compensate C in some other manner? B acted in good faith, in buying the property at the
judicial sale, in accordance with a valid decree of a court
of equity, and paid a valuable consideration. True enough,
if the owner of the machine had known of the pendency of
the proceeding, he would have intervened, and the Court, if
satisfied as to his innocence, would have ordered his automobile released to him. But in contemplation of law, all
parties interested (inCluding C) would have constructive
notice by the publication and posting; there would be nothing to indicate that C was the rightful owner; and the decree of the court purported to direct and enable the sheriff
to sell the property and convey a good title to the buyer.
8

Wooumff v. Taylor, 20 Vt. 65 (1847).
Sup

, n.

8.
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Yet, on the other hand, it was C's automobile that was condemned and sold; and C, as a matter of fact, had no actual
knowledge of the proceeding by which his property was
forfeited, and, therefore, no actual notice to come in and
defend his rights.
It might plausibly be contended that the same principles
apply here as in the case of a ship brought into a prize
court, on account of running a blockade. Yet there is this
essential difference: The seizure of a vessel entering or
leaving a port in violation of a blockade is the exercise of
the war power of a sovereign state, striking at the enemy
belligerent in a struggle in which the state is engaged in
preserving perhaps its very political existence, while seizure of a rum-running vehicle is unquestionably an exercise
of the state's police power,-that power which "extends
to all matters affecting the peace, order, health, morals,
convenience, comfort and safety of its citizens." 7 However
much controverted may be the precise scope of the police
power, if there ever was a clear case for its exercise, it is
here presented.
In the case of the blockade runner, if the true owner of
the offending vessel intervenes before the actual condemnation of the ship as a prize, and proves to the satisfaction
of the court that his property had been used without his
authority, or knowledge, or consent, as, for example, where
a neutral vessel is seized by a German crew who employ it in running the British blockade,--there, by the
principles of international 'law, the property captured by
the blockading nation should be restored to the innocent
owner, who has not been negligent, or otherwise at fault.
But if the condemnation has already taken place and the
boat sold as a prize, the former owner is concluded, on the
ground that the consfication is an in rem proceeding. The
next proposition for consideration is whether the condemnation of the blockade runner, which, it is agreed, is in rem, is
so analogous to that of the rum-running automobile as to
make the forfeiture of the latter an in rem proceeding,-and,
therefore binding upon the whole world, rather than a suit
quasi in rem, and conclusively adjudicating the rights only of
7 MCQUILLAN,

IUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,

§889 (1913) ; Fruth v. Board of Affairs, '5

W. Va. 456. 84 S. E. 105 X1915).
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the parties thereto. In the absence of West Virginia decisions directly in point, the reported cases of other states
have been examined to ascertain the manner in which their
courts have handled the question here under discussion.
Blakemore lays down the proposition that "the seizure
of an automobile because unlawfully used in the transportation of liquor is a proceeding in rem," in stating the rule of
law enunciated in a number of jurisdictions, including Alabama, 9 and Virginia. 10 And it has been decided in New
York that the state need prove its case only by a preponderance of the evidence." In Maine, the purchaser of an
automobile takes subject to the rights of an innocent claimant.1 2 Likewise, in Alabama, although the court has declared the confiscation of liquor-carrying vehicles to be an
action in rem, it is held that where the owner is innocent in
regard to the unlawful use of his automobile, it is erroneous
to sell the car, and the proceeds of the sale should be returned to him.'
This proposition finds support in the dissenting opinion of Stephen J., of the Georgia court, who
strongly insists that where the wife's car, while in the possession of the husband who is using it to transport intoxicants without the owner's consent or knowledge, is seized
and sold on condemnation, she may assert her rights in an
action of trover against the purchaser at the condemnation sale ;14 and in New York the owner of property taken
illegally may maintain an action of replevin. 15 In this connection, it should be borne in mind that the West Virginia
statute0 provides the "husband or wife to an offender
shall not be deemed bona fide owners within the meaning
of this act."
In a few states, however, a vehicle used in the illegal
transportation of liquor may be forfeited merely on evidence that the owner voluntarily parted with possession,
without evidence of guilty knowledge or negligence on his
part, as in Virginia,' 7 where the automobile is forfeited notwithstanding a prior recorded lien ;18 or in Nebraska, where
B
BLAREMORE ON PROHIBrIION (2nd ed.). p. 580 (1925).
.In 'e
One Ford Automobile, 205 Ala. 193, 87 So. 842 (1921).

10 Landers v. Commonwealth, 126 Va. 780, 101 S. E. 778 (1919).

14 In re Holcomb, 192 N. Y. S. 407 (1921).
'2 State v. Paige Touring Car, 120 Me. 496, 115 At. 275 (1921).
1S Eckl V. State, 205 Ala. 466, 88 So. 567 (1921).
'A Hennon v. Jones, 25 Ga. App. 525, 103 S. E. 784 (1920).
' Gatto v. Murray, 190 N. Y. S. 360; People ex rel Wallace, Dist. Atty. v. Christman Muncipial Court Justice, et cr., 191 N. Y. S. 704 (1921).
18 W. VA. CODE, c. 82A, §14 and §17, supra.
IT Buchholtz v. Commonwealth, 127 Va. 794, 102 S. E. 760 (1920).
Is Pennington v. Commonwealth, 127 Va. 803, 102 S. E. 768 (1920).
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the court has held that, although the plaintiff sold the car to
the accused and recorded a first mortgage lien, the vendor
is not protected. 19 Nevertheless, relief from forfeiture rests
in the discretion of the trial court ;20 and no forfeiture will
be declared, moreover, where the real owner had no knowledge of the illegal transportation and was not guilty of
negligence in failing to prevent such use of his property,
according to an Alabama decision ;21 and a similar view is
expressed by the Oklahoma court.22 Thorpe2 believes that
the statutes of many states, as expressive of the legislative
intent, do not contemplate the condemnation of the property of those who have not aided in the unlawful transportation, and were not charged with knowledge that their
property would be so used, and he cites a number of cases
in support of that proposition, including cases from Alabama, 24 Idaho, 2z and Maine. 26 In the Idaho Case, the captured car was sold under a conditional sales contract,
which stipulated that the vendor should retain title, ownership, and right to possession until Muir, the buyer, should
pay the last instalment; Muir leased the car to a third
party, to be used in liquor carriage, of which arrangement
the seller was unaware, until after the seizure-and the
court held that the vendor was entitled to recover the vehicle, and that replevin lay against the sheriff for its detention. Blakemore2 reaches the conclusion that the interest
of the innocent owner or lienor is not forfeited, in most
states, if he has been guilty of neither complicity nor negligence.
On the other hand, it has been held s that, in the Kansas
statute providing for forfeiture of vehicles employed in violation of the prohibition law, there was clearly no legislative
intent to protect the rights of innocent owners or mortgagees and, further, that such an enactment does not violate
the "due process" clause of the Federal Constitution; and
the court declares that "it is within the police power of the
state to provide for the forfeiture of property used in violation of a criminal statute, and to provide expressly that the
Robinson Cadillac Motor Car Co. v. Ratekin, 104 Neb. 869, 177 N. W. 837 (1920).
0 Mason v. Commonwealth, 137 Va. 819, 120 S. E. 133 (1923).
21 Briscoe Motor Car Co. v. State, 204 Ala. 231, 85 So. 475 (1920).
2 One Buick Car v. State, 77 Ok]. 233, 188 Pac. 108 (1920).
23 THORPE, PROHIBITION AND INDUSTRIAL LIQUOR §946 (1926).

21Briscoe Motor Car Co. v. State, supra, n. 21.
2 Naylor v. Simmons, 33 Idaho 320, 194 1pac. 94 (1920).
= State v. One Buick Automobile, 122 Me. 280, 119 At.
2? BLAKEMORE ON PROHIBITION, supra, n. 8.

666 (1928).

23 State v. Peterson, 107 Kan. 641, 193 Pac. 842 (1920).
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rights of an owner or mortgagee, however innocent of the
intent or purpose for which the property is to be used, shall
be forfeited, and such law is not open to the objection that
it violates the fourteenth amendment by taking property
without due process of law." Equally harsh is the rule in
Virginia, where it has been adjudicated that, if an automobile is used by a member of the owner's family without his
consent for transporting liquor unlawfully, it may be forfeited, and in the requisite proceeding personal service on
the owner is not necessary. 29 But, as the writer has pointed
out supra, a milder rule prevails in many jurisdictions, as in
Georgia, 0 or in Alabama, in which State it has been held
that the owner is entitled to the return of his machine,
operated without his permission or consent by a younger
brother in violation of the State prohibition law.31
Under the National Prohibition Act the innocent owner of
a vehicle unlawfully engaged in the carriage of intoxicants is
protected, 32 but the owner must show good cause why his
property should not be forfeited. 33 The Volstead Act repealed the prior statute providing for forfeiture of vehicles
used for illegal transportation. 34 But the confiscation of
vehicles employed in the carriage of lquors on which the
Federal tax has not been paid is absolute ;35 and this harsh
result likewise follows, in condemnation proceedings under
the Indian Appropriation Act of March 2, 1917, relating to
the importation of intoxicants into Indian country. 0
It must be admitted, in conclusion, that no very satisfactory general rule can be deduced from the conflicting views
taken by the various jurisdictions, as to the precise nature
of the forfeiture proceedings. Alabama, for instance, calls
the confiscatfon a suit in rem, and, nevertheless, holds that
the innocent owner or lienor is entitled to be relieved against
its effects; while Virginia's attitude, in denying protection
to such owner or lienor, is squarely contra. In many of the
cases cited, the decision turns upon the legislative intent as
expressed in the widely varying statutes of the various
States; therefore, the cases must be studied in the light of
2 Landers v. Commonwealth, supra, n. 10.
" Mays v. Curry, 150 Ga. 290, 103 S. E. 458 (1920).
In re Gattina, 203 Ala. 517, 84 So. 760 (1919).
'2 United States v. Brockley, 266 Fed. 1091 (1920).
'5United States v. One Shaw Automobile, 272 Fed. 491 (1921).
United States v. One Haynes Automobile, 268 Fed. 1003 (1920).
Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 505 (1921).
United States v. One Seven Passenger Paige Car, 259 Fed. 641 (1919).
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the dissimilar statutes upon which they are based. Huddy 7
summarizes the situation thus: "In some states the forfeiture is absolute, regardless of the innocence of the person
asserting a claim on the machine; but generally the rights
of an innocent lienor or owner may be asserted and protected by the court." As it was pointed out supra, the West
Virginia Court has not been called upon to decide whether
the rights of the morally innocent owner of a seized automobile would be concluded by the condemnation of his property, if, through no negligence or other fault on his part, he
did not intervene to assert his interests until after the hearing and the sheriff's sale to a purchaser in good faith and for
valuable consideration. But since the legislative intent seems
to direct the penalty primarily against the person using the
vehicle in violation of the prohibition enactment rather than
against the vehicle itself, the writer ventures to suggest
that, if the supposed situation should arise in this State, the
Court might be inclined to treat the proceeding, as to such
innocent claimant, as a suit quasi in rem, and grant him
relief, although it is possible that our Court might follow
the Virginia decisions on this question.
-G. D. H.
17HUDDY

ON AUTOMOBIrES §1302 (1924).
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